外商直接投资和技术溢出泰国制造业的一个跨行业分析外文翻译.doc

毕业论文（设计）外文翻译一、外文原文Foreign direct investment and Technology Spillover: A Cross-industry Analysis of Thai ManufacturingImportance of the issueForeign direct investment (FDI) has been widely recognized as a growth-enhancing factor in investment receiving (host) countries. FDI not only brings in capital but also introduces advanced technology that can enhance the technological capability of the host country firms, thereby generating long-term and sustainable economic growth. More importantly, the technological benefit is not limited to locally affiliated firms but can also spread to non-affiliated ones. The latter benefit is usually referred to as technology spillover.The expectation of gaining from technology spillover persuades many developing countries to offer various incentives in order to attract FDI. However the results of empirical research to test the validity of technology spillover are far from conclusive. Positive technology spillover from FDI has only been found in some countries.1 Overall, the findings seem to suggest technology spillover is not automatic, but depends on both country specific factors and policy environment.Foreign Presence in Thai ManufacturingThirdly, foreign plants are likely to be located in a highly protected industry. The average ERP2 of industries whose output shares of foreign plants are greater than 50% is 15.3%. The exception in these industries would be electrical machinery which is presumably dominated by labor-intensive assembled electronics and electrical appliances. On the other hand, regarding the industries where the share of foreign plants is less than 50%, average ERP tends to be lower at around 10.8%. In addition, the output share of foreign plants is likely to be associated with the degree of market concentration.Involvement of foreign plants in the manufacturing sector was predominately in import substituting industries such as textiles, automobiles, and chemicals up to about the late 1970s (Akira, 1989). From then on, it was directed to more export-oriented activities. To begin with, export-oriented foreign firms entered light manufacturing industries such as clothing, footwear, and toys. More recently, labor-intensive assembly activities in electronics and electrical goods industries have been the main attraction for foreign investors (Kohpaiboon, 2005).Such involvement has closely mirrored the shift in the trade policy regime. Thailand began its first national economic development plan in 1961 with an import substitution (IS) regime to promote industrialization. Tariffs were the major instrument used to influence the countrys development path. The role of tariffs to promote the domestic industry effectively began in 1974 with the imposition of an escalating tariff structure, where the tariff rate ascended from raw materials to finished products. These changes increasingly favored the production of finished products, particularly consumer products. In 1975, the range of the effective rate of protection (ERP) in the Thai manufacturing sector was between 36 to 350% (Akrasanee & Ajanant, 1986). In 1982, the variation widened from 25.2 to 1,693.4% (Chunanantathum et al. 1984). Several industries, such as textiles, tyres, furniture, automobiles, and leather products, had an extremely high ERP. There was also a high degree of variation in ERP across industries. This tariff structure remained virtually unchanged until the late 1980s, even though in 1974 the government announced a change in development strategy to an export promotion (EP) regime.Significant tariff reductions commenced in 1988, starting with electrical and electronic goods as well as with the inputs into these products. Comprehensive packages of tariff reform were implemented in 1995 and 1997. It involved tariff reduction and rationalization. Maximum tariffs were reduced from 100% in the early 1990s to 30%. By the end of the 1990s, the tariff bands were reduced from 39 to 6 tariff rates (0, 1, 5, 10, 20 and 30%). The two low rates (0 and 1%) were for raw materials and the two top rates (20 and 30%) for finished products with the two middle rates for intermediate goods. In addition, tariff restructuring has received renewed emphasis as an essential part of the overall economic reforms aimed at strengthening efficiency and competitiveness over the past two years. The Thai government introduced another effort to lower tariff rates, commencing in June 2003 (implemented in October 2003), followed by a fouryear period of tariff reduction from 2004 to 2008. There are around 900 items involved in the second round of tariff reductions, covering a wide range of manufacturing products. The tariff reduction in this round is mainly on intermediate products, thereby maintaining the escalating tariff structure. The magnitude of tariff reduction is moderate, within the range of 0 to 8.9% (Athukorala et al. 2004).As a result, average tariffs declined markedly from 30.2% in 1990 to 21.3% in 1995 and further to 11% in 2005. The dispersion of ERP also narrowed over the periods across industries. In 2003, the ERP range reduced to -27.1 to 142% (Athukorala et al. 2004).4 The changes in the tariff structure would have significantly improved the incentive to attract FDI to industries where Thailand has a comparative advantage in international production.Analytical FrameworkTechnology spillover from FDI is said to take place when the presence of a foreign firm generates productivity or efficiency benefits for the host countrys local non-affiliated firms (Blomstrm & Kokko,1998). As mentioned, technology spillover from FDI is not automatic but rather conditioned on the nature of the trade policy regime across industries. A theoretical framework for examining the effect of the trade policy regime on the gains from FDI in a given host country was first presented by Bhagwati (1973) as an extension to his theory of immiserizing growth. It was further developed by Bhagwati (1985, 1994); Brecher & Diaz-Alejandro (1977); and Brecher & Findlay (1983). A key hypothesis arising from this literature is that technology spillover tends to be smaller, or possibly even negative, under a restrictive, import substitution (IS) regime compared with a liberalizing, export promotion (EP) regime.To illustrate how technology spillover takes place as well as how the trade policy regime across industries can alter the magnitude of these spillovers as suggested by Bhagwati (1973), we use the theoretical model developed by Wang & Blomstrm (1992). In the model, there are two firms, namely an affiliate of a multinational enterprise (MNE) and a local non-affiliated firm (henceforth referred to as the foreign and local firms, respectively), producing differentiated but substitutable products for the host country market. Technology spillover is an outcome of interaction of these two firms. On the one hand, the entry of a foreign firm is always associated with some amount of proprietary technology from the parent company so as to offset the potential disadvantage against the local firm possessing superior knowledge of the availability of factor inputs, business practices and/or consumer preferences in the host country. In addition, advanced technology would help the foreign firm to gain market share in the host country. However transferring technology from MNEs headquarter to its affiliates are costly. The more the advance level of technology transferred, the larger the dollar costs associated with the transfer.Because of the presence of cost and benefit, the foreign firm has to decide the effort of undertaking technology transferred from its headquarter to maximize its net benefit. Such effort would depend on the local firms response to the presence of the foreign firm. In a situation where the local firm actively puts in the effort to learn the advanced technology associated with the foreign firm, the technology superiority of the latter will not last long. As the result, it will need to keep undertaking technology transfer activities in the following period in order to maintain the advantage or even to just survive in the host country environment. In contrast, a situation where the local firm is less responsive in attempting to learn the associated technology provides relatively less incentive for the foreign firm to continue to actively undertake technology transfers from its parent company.On the other hand, the local firm can observe, learn, and adapt superior technology associated with the foreign firm to enhance its own technological capability. This is because the technology accompanied with the foreign firm has certain public good qualities, which cannot be fully internalized, thus the localization of the foreign firm could potentially generate positive externality in terms of technological benefit to the local firm. Since the market success of each firm depends on the level of technology it employs, this encourages the local firm to learn the associated superior technology. Nevertheless, the effort of learning and adapting the associated technology is associated with the dollar amount of cost so that the local firm has to decide its effort to learn associated advanced technology. Similar to the foreign firm, the learning effort of the local firm also depends on the foreign firm behavior.To incorporate the Bhagwati hypothesis, the model discussed above is modified by hypothesizing that the trade policy regime influences the cost effectiveness in the learning activities of the local firm. That is, every effort to enhance the technological capability of the local firm is more costly in any industry where the trade regime is more restrictive. This is because much of the FDI flowing to an industry with high trade restrictions often enters relatively capital- and skill-intensive products where output is mainly supplied for a highly protected domestic market. Although the production technology associated with FDI is typically older and less advanced than used in the MNEs home country, it is often relatively capital-and skill-intensive compared to those employed by the local firm. In this environment, it is more difficult for the local firm to learn the advanced technology. Instead the highly protected domestic market might encourage the local firm to produce products not directly competitive with those being produced by the foreign affiliate and to enjoy economic rents induced by the regime. Kokko (1994) refers to this as a situation where the foreign affiliate in such an industry may operate in enclaves in isolation from the local firm.In contrast, in the context of a liberal trade regime, technology spillover from a foreign presence is likely to generate a more productivity enhancing effect. This is because the main incentives for FDI in a given host country are the relatively low labor costs and/or availability of raw materials. FDI inflows under an EP trade regime can be expected to employ technologies more in line with the host countrys comparative advantage. A higher level of policy neutrality creates a higher likelihood for MNEs to become involved with the host countrys production to serve their strategy for maintaining a competitive position in international markets. With this motivation, the associated advanced technology will be cutting edge and make use of existing resource endowments in the host country (Moran, 2001). Under these circumstances, it is easier for the demonstration effect of foreign involvement in the host country to operate. Global competition makes all economic agents actively seek technological innovation to improve efficiency.ConclusionThis paper examines technology spillover from FDI based on a cross-industry analysis of Thai manufacturing. The prime objective has been to test the Bhagwati hypothesis that technology spillover is unlikely to take place in highly trade-restricted industries compared to more exportoriented ones. In order to allow for the simultaneity between sectoral productivity and the foreign presence, this study uses a system of two equations (productivity determinants and FDI determinants) to test the key hypothesis. The regression results fail to reject the Bhagwati hypothesis. There is also evidence that trade barriers as well as the size of the domestic market play an important role in determining inter-industry differences in FDI participation. These findings also support the Bhagwati hypothesis. In sum, the results suggest that liberalizing the foreign investment regime while retaining a restrictive trade policy is likely to induce the type of FDI inflows that is unlikely to introduce technology spillover.二、翻译文章外商直接投资和技术溢出：泰国制造业的一个跨行业分析问题的重要性外商直接投资已被广泛确认为是对接受投资的国家的一种促进增长的要素。外商直接投资不仅带来了资金，也引进了先进的技术，提高了东道国公司的技术能力，从而产生长期和可持续的经济增长。更重要的是，技术的好处不仅限于当地子公司还可以蔓延到非关联公司。后者的利益就是通常所说的技术外溢效应。技术溢出获利的可能性使得许多发展中国家为了吸引外资而提供各种优惠。然而从根据技术溢出有效性的实证研究的结果来看，还远远没有定论。而外商直接投资的正向技术溢出还仅仅只在一些国家被发现。总体而言，该发现似乎表明了技术溢出不是自然而然的，而是取决于国家的特定因素和政策坏境。泰国制造业中的外国厂商第三，外国工厂可能处在一个被高度保护的行业位置。外国工厂的产量份额超过50%的行业的平均有效保护率是15.3%。而除了这些行业外，其他的主要是以组装电子产品和电器为主的电气机械。另一方面，外国工厂的份额却不足50%，而平均有效保护率低于10.8%。此外，外国工厂的产量份额可能与市场集中的程度密切相关。制造业部门中的外国工厂的参与在进口替代行业中占主导地位，比如70年代末的纺织，汽车和化学品。从此，开始了针对更多的出口为导向的活动。首先，以出口为导向的外国公司进入了如服装，鞋类和玩具等轻工制造业。最近，在电子和电器行业中的劳动密集型装配活动已经成为吸引外国投资者的主要领域。这种参与反映了再贸易政策体制上的转变。1961年，在进口替代制度下，泰国开始了他的第一个国家经济发展计划，以此来促进工业化。关税是用来影响国家发展道路的重要手段。1974年，从一个原料到成品的关税税率的增加使关税结构不断升级，关税开始对有效促进国内产业起作用。这些变化不断促进成品的生产，尤其是消费品。1975年，该保护在泰国制造业的效率范围为-36到350%。1982年，变化扩大范围从-25.2至1693.4%。几个像纺织品、轮胎、家具、汽车和皮革制品等有一个非常高的有效保护率。同时在各行业中有效保护率也有一个很高程度的变化。直到80年代末，这种关税结构大致保持不变，即使是在1974年政府宣布了新的出口促进制度的发展战略也没有多大改变。1988年，泰国政府显著降低了电子和电子产品以及这些产品中间投入物的关税。在1995年和1997年关税改革开始全面实施。它涉及关税削减和合理化。最高关税从90年代初的100%降低到30%。到1990年为止，关税税率等级从39个降到6个。最低的两个税率是针对原材料的，最高的两个税率是针对成品的，而中间的两个税率是针对中间产品的。此外，关税调整已经起到了一个重新强调加强过去两年的效率和竞争力的整体经济改革的潜在部分的目的的作用。从2003年开始，泰国政府推出了另一种降低关税税率的方法，从2004年到2008年四年为一个阶段来削减关税。在第二轮削减关税时涉及约900个覆盖范围广泛的制造业项目。这轮的关税削减主要针对中间产品，从而维持了关税结构的升级。关税削减的幅度在0至8.9%是属于适中的。结果，平均关税从1990年的30.2%显著降低到了1995年的21.3%，进而到了2005年的11%。有效保护率的分散也缩小了产业化的所需时间。2003年，有效保护率的范围降低到-27.1至142%。在关税结构中的变化已经极大的改善了泰国行业在国际产品上拥有的比较优势，从而吸引了外商直接投资。分析架构当一个外国公司的生产率或效率的存在有利于东道国本地非联营的公司时就会发生外商直接投资的技术溢出。如上所述，外商直接投资的技术溢出不是自动的，而是以整个行业的贸易政策制度为条件的。巴格沃蒂首次提出了一个用东道国外商直接投资收益对贸易政策制度效应的审查的理论架构，并将其作为对他的贫困化增长理论的延伸。并且它被巴格瓦蒂、布雷赫尔及迪亚兹、亚历杭德罗和布雷赫尔和芬德利进一步发展。从本文献中提出的关键假设是，相比开放的，出口促进制度，在进口替代制度的限制下，技术溢出显得更小或可能更负面。为了说明技术溢出是如何发生的和跨行业的贸易政策制度如何改变这些如巴格沃蒂所提议的溢出的严重程度，我们使用汪和Blomstrom开发的理论模型。在模型中，有两个公司，即一个跨国企业的子公司和一个当地的非关联公司为东道国市场生产不同的但可以替代的产品。技术外溢是这两公司相互作用的结果。一方面，外国公司的进入与来自母公司拥有的私有技术有关系，为了抵消潜在的劣势，即当地企业拥有的要素投入、商业管理或消费者偏好。此外，先进的技术会帮助外国公司在东道国获得市场份额。然而，跨国公司从总部转移技术到子公司需要昂贵的成本。转移的技术越先进，转移的成本就越高。由于成本和利益的存在，外国公司不得不决定努力从总部采取技术转移来使净收益最大化。这样的努力取决于当地企业对外国公司存在的反应。在本地公司不断向相关的外国公司学习先进技术的情况下，其技术优势将不会持续很久。因此，为了保持优势或在东道国生存下来就需要在下列期间不断实行技术转移。与此相反，当出现对当地公司尝试学习相关技术的反应较少时，反而会使外国公司更加缺少动力去继续从母公司获得技术转移。另一方面，本地公司可以从相关的外国公司观察、学习和适应先进的技术来加强自己的技术能力。这是因为本国技术与外国公司相比已经有一定的公共性质，不能完全内部化，因此外