《企业集团财务管理》财务案例.ppt

<p>财务案例5/22/20241-目标负债政策：杜邦(Du-Pont)公司（1983）n背景回顾n1802年成立n1900年开始扩张n1980年，Fortune500(15),1981年,Fortune500(7)n与Conoco的合并(1981)：对公司财务政策的改变n负债率的上升（42%）n债券等级的下降（AAA的丧失）n资本结构政策，1965-1982n保守的财务历史：低负债率n高盈利率和负财务杠杆n1960s末-1970s中，行业竞争加剧和经营困境n1974年石油危机的冲击和资本支出的增加5/22/20242-n资本结构政策，1965-1982n滞胀的影响：支出膨胀和收入紧缩n资金的短缺n负债率的上升：7%（1972）到27%（1975）n利息保障倍数：38.4-4.6nAAA债券n负债率的下降（经营改善）：20%（1979）n利息保障倍数：11.5nAAA债券n1981年收购Conoco：$80亿（溢价77%）n融资：39亿股票和38.5债券n负债率：40%（1981）n债券降级：AA级5/22/20243-n资本结构政策，1965-1982n并购的评价n杜邦：规模经济和分散化（商业风险的降低）n市场：反应消极n分析师：winners cursen融资政策的评价n保守政策：财务弹性最大化n财务弹性最大化的偏离n财务杠杆和财务危机n盈利能力和商业风险n分散化对融资能力的影响n能否创造价值：税盾功能5/22/20244-n未来资本结构政策n投资决策和经营环境的变化n资本支出和R&amp;D支出：资金需求n规模经济和多元化n财务弹性的追求：目标负债率n债券等级和融资判断力量n资本成本n次序融资理论5/22/20245-时代(times)公司进入娱乐业n时代公司n1924：时代的出版n35年：财富和生活的出版n1970s-1980s的并购和多元化n1989的refocus：出版业n杂志（42%）、图书（15%）和有线电视（43%）n行业和竞争动态n娱乐业的纵向一体化n发行渠道的畅通n制作权利及其垄断性资源的分享n时代公司（1990）的战略 5/22/20246-n可能的合并伙伴n目标企业的经营业务分析和资源评估n哥伦比亚：电影（44%）、电视（41%）和展示会（13%），缺乏地方特许资产（电视播放权和发行权）nDisney：游乐和度假（64%）、电影娱乐（30%）和消费品（6%），缺乏地方特许资产，度假利润比重过大（715）n20世纪Fox：电影娱乐及其制作播放，缺乏地方特许资产nMCA：电影娱乐和音乐娱乐，地方特许资产不足n缺乏特许(垄断性)资源(如长期签约的明星)会令企业置于被套牢的境地n目标锁定：华纳和派拉蒙n华纳通讯公司n电影娱乐（40%）、音乐录音和出版（45%）、有线和广播（11%）和出版发行（4%），广泛的影院分销网络，丰富的特许资源，卓越的管理经验以及电影电视有线经营方面的领导地位和国际化，适度的负债n文化差异和管理协调n派拉蒙：娱乐（39%）、出版/信息（23%）和消费者/商业融资（38%），电影娱乐的巨大份额，广泛的发行网络和丰富的特许权资源，过高的金融利润比例（41%）（与时代娱乐战略不相符合）5/22/20247-n管理当局的决策n华纳管理人员的安排n补偿金和继任计划n时代对管理的控制权n合并公司董事会：24（时代12、华纳12）n对目标和主体的估价n华纳:65-73n时代:189-212n合并前（19893/3）：时代:109.25,华纳:45.875n合并方式：股票交换方式n股票交换的优势：财务压力和会计处理n时代:华纳=0.465:1n股东大会的批准5/22/20248-n市场反应（1989/3/4）n时代的股票：107.5n华纳的股票:48.25n派拉蒙公司：corporate raidern派拉蒙公司的产业战略n敌意接管n对时代的收购n竞标价格：175n收购条件：时代放弃华纳n市场反应n时代:144-170n华纳:50.75-54.755/22/20249-n时代公司管理当局的选择n接受派拉蒙的接管n派拉蒙公司竞价的吸引度n时代的独立性n时代的编辑独立性n派拉蒙公司的声明n兼并华纳n管理者的困境n股东的意见n商业判断法则的保护5/22/202410-彩虹公司n方案1：更新设备n初始投资：35000，预计使用15年n节约成本：5000n资本成本：12%n方案2：保持n投资支出：500/年n服务寿命延长n方案3：bettermentn资本支出：成本节约的20%/年n回报：成本节约增加4%5/22/202411-阿鲁恩代尔partner：续集拍摄项目n电影和续集n电影业的资金困境n风险投资的特征n电影成功的高度不确定性n艺术和商业的矛盾n投资和融资的障碍n阿鲁恩代尔partnern续集拍摄权的出售n缓解电影业的资金困境5/22/202412-阿鲁恩代尔partner：续集拍摄项目n电影业的经营流程n续集拍摄权的估价nReal optionn具有timing特征n电影成功和价值的估计n电影业的现金流n票房和广告5/22/202413-马里奥特(Marriott)公司：资本成本n投资门坎：要求的报酬率n最低报酬率对投资取舍的影响n对未来收益现值的影响n对公司增长的影响n提高的最低报酬率会减少投资n公司背景n啤酒饮料n多元化：住宿、合同服务和饭店n相关多元化n非相关多元化：混合经营(conglomerate)5/22/202414-马里奥特公司：资本成本n财务战略n酒店管理（不拥有物业）n开发酒店业，寻求合作者nHilton and Holiday innn提供专业化管理：经营控制权n控制了$70亿联合经营的酒店（1987）n经营收益：管理费n投资于能够增加股东价值的项目nNPV法则：现金流量分析预测n最低报酬率：风险评估n优化资本结构n利息保障倍数目标：调整债务比重n回购价值低估的股票n行业市盈率n1360万股票($4.29亿)（1987）5/22/202415-马里奥特公司：资本成本n资本成本nWACCn举债能力和负债成本n债券评级和利息溢价n债券评级和财务杠杆（财务风险）n权益成本n部门（注意与杠杆的关系）n风险溢价的估计：n无风险利率：国债收益率n市场报酬率：S&amp;P500指数回报率n部门WACCn企业WACC5/22/202416-系统工程实验室公司：信息不对称与价格偏差n公司的成长n1966/3，IPO：24万股（$4.5/股）n1967/11，二次发行股票：10万股（$22/股）n1969，三次发行股票：25万股（$40.25/股）n19701974年：经营波动n1971年出现销售滑坡和大额损失n经济疲软、灾难性收购和过时存货n损失：1000万n1972年，投入新产品，销售恢复n1974年，损失3800万n经营损失（2600）、过时存货（1200）、中止过时产品生产线（1300）和土地出售利得（1300）n1974年，成功开发一项产品5/22/202417-系统工程实验室公司：信息不对称与价格偏差n公司融资n周转信用融资安排n信用限额的提高n合约的放宽n银行融资的短缺n新的融资需求n1978年：新的成长和投资机会5/22/202418-系统工程实验室公司：信息不对称与价格偏差n发行普通股n公司良好前景：EPS的增长和股价的上升n权益证券市场疲软n小公司市场也不景气n市净率较低n发行1000万股票n市场压力：现有股价的回落n可能的发行价：$8/股（手续费后净价$7.25）n账面价值：$4.55/股（可行的市净率）n偏低的市净率和市盈率（较之主要竞争对手）5/22/202419-系统工程实验室公司：信息不对称与价格偏差n发行债券n公司的债券等级n可能非常低的（CCC）债券等级n依据公司规模和盈利史n发行困难n1976年末，低等级债券较受欢迎n多个共同基金和投资银行专门认购低级债券n不同等级债券之间的利率差别开始缩小n投资者愿意承担风险，以换取较高的收益率nJunk bond market活跃n发行债券计划n12.5%利率，15年期限债券：10001500万n竞争对手的债券发行计划5/22/202420-Takeover specialist and corporate raider:Boone PickensnBoone Pickens:Chairman of Mesa PetroleumnTakeover battles in the oil industry in 1980snChanges in oil companies financial policies under takeover forcenPickens make a lot of money by losing his war5/22/202421-nMesas attack on Cities Service nThe battle begin in May 1982nMesa bought Cities shares for a takeover bidnCities counterattack:issued more shares to dilute Mesas holding and made a retaliatory offer for Mesa(pacman defense:take over the attacker)nMesa continued to up its bid for Cities,and Cities twice increased its bid for MesanCities won in the end:Mesa agreed to call off its bid and not to make another takeover for five years.In exchange,Cities agreed to repurchase Mesas holdings at$80m profit to Mesa(greenmail payment)nCities looked for a white knight(friendly acquirer),Gulf OilnCities was bought by Occidental Petroleum in 1983n$55 per share in cash for 45%of Cities,fixed income securities for the remaining stock(two-tier offer)5/22/202422-nMesas war on Gulf OilnGulf itself became a takeover target one year after its brief help to CitiesnChevron came to rescue and acquired Gulf for$13.2b,more than double its value six months earlier.nChevrons bid gave Mesa$760m profit on the Gulf shares it had boughtnWhy was Gulf worth the much more to Chevron than to investors just a few months earlier?Where was the added value5/22/202423-nPickenss battle against Phillips PetroleumnMesa had accumulated 6%of Phillips at an average price of$38 per share and made a bid for a further 15%at$60 per sharenPhillips responsesnGreenmail payment:bought out Mesa,gave Mesa$89m profitnRaised its dividend by 25%,nReduced capital spending,and sold$2b of assetsnCut capital expenditures by$1700m,cut employees by 3500nRepurchased about 50%stock and issued$4.5b of debtnLeverage ratio:61%(1984)to 88%(1985)5/22/202424-nPickenss battle against Phillips PetroleumnHow did this restructuring shield Phillips from takeovernRestructuring responses reveal why Phillips was such an attractive targetnRestructuring drastically reduced the total market value of Phillips outstanding stock and reduced the likely cost of buying out its remaining shareholdersnBut restructuring removes the chief motive for takeover,which was to force Phillips to generate and pay out more cash to investorsnBefore restructuring,investors sensed that Phillips was not running a tight ship and worried that it would plow back its ample operating CF into mediocre capital investments or ill-advised expansion.Consequently,Phillipss share price did not reflect the potential value of its assets and operations.That created opportunity for a takeover.nPhillipss management bowed to market pressure and undertook the surgery themselves.5/22/202425-nPickenss battle against Phillips PetroleumnUnocal won over Pickens in 1985nUnocal repurchase outstanding shareholders stock except PickensnA Board could,in the extreme,pay out all the corporations assets and leave the acquirer holding a worthless empty shell.nIn addition to Mesas losses,shareholders of all Delaware corporations lose because the courts decision gives management a weapon so powerful it essentially guarantees that no Delaware corporation that uses it will be taken over by a tender offer(Jensen,1985).5/22/202426-nPickenss battle against Phillips PetroleumnThere are two lessons herenWhen merger motive is to eliminate inefficiency or to distribute excess cash,the targets best defense is to do what the bidder would do.nWhy a company with ample free cash flow can be a tempting target for takeovernThe oil industry entered the 1980s with more-than-ample free cash flownRising oil price:increased revenues and operating profitnInvestment opportunities had not expanded proportionatelynOverinvestment:massive,negative-NPV outlaysnCorporate raiders gain:could increase value by putting the fat target company on a dietnBust-up takeover5/22/202427-RJR Nabisco and LBO5/22/202428-</p>