国际经济学(双语)-第4章.ppt
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1、Tariffs and Nontariff BarriersInternational EconomicsChapter 4Chapter 4 Tariffs and Nontariff Barriersn4.1 Theories for Trade Protectionn4.2 Tariffsn4.3 Nontariff Trade Barriers4.1 Theories for Trade Protectionn Infant Industry Argument uThis argument contends that for free trade to be meaningful,tr
2、ading countries should temporarily shield their newly developing industries from foreign competition.4.1 Theories for Trade ProtectionuSome truths in the infant industry argument:lOnce a protective tariff is imposed,it is very difficult to remove,even after industrial maturity has been achieved.lIt
3、is very difficult to determine which industries will be capable of realizing comparative advantage potential and thus merit protection.l The argument generally is not valid for mature,industrialized countries.lThere may be other ways of insulating a developing industry from cutthroat competition.Rat
4、her than adopt a protective tariff,the government could grant a subsidy to the industry.4.1 Theories for Trade ProtectionnTerms of Trade ArgumentuIn some cases,the terms of trade benefits of a tariff outweigh its costs,so there is a terms-of-trade argument for a tariff.uThe terms of trade argument a
5、gainst free trade,then,is intellectually impeccable but of doubtful usefulness.uIn practice,it is emphasized more by economists as a theoretical proposition than it is used by governments as a justification for trade policy.4.1 Theories for Trade ProtectionnDomestic Market Failure Argument uTheory o
6、f the second best lWhen economists apply the theory of the second best to trade policy,they argue that imperfections in the internal functioning of an economy may justify interfering in its external economic relations.lThis argument accepts that international trade is not the source of the problem b
7、ut suggests nonetheless that trade policy can provide at least a partial solution.4.1 Theories for Trade ProtectionnStrategic Trade Policyu Because of the small number of firms,the assumption of perfect competition does not apply.There are only a few firms in effective competition in some industries
8、.uThis argument locates the market failure that justifies government intervention in the lack of perfect competition.uIt is possible in principle for a government to alter the rules of the game to shift these excess returns from foreign to domestic firms.Chapter 4 Tariffs and Nontariff Barriersn4.1
9、Theories for Trade Protectionn4.2 Tariffsn4.3 Nontariff Trade Barriers4.2 TariffsnA tariff is simply a tax(duty)levied on a product when it crosses national boundaries.uImport tariff v.s.Export tariff uProtective tariff v.s.Revenue tariff nTypes of Tariffs uSpecific Tariff uAd Valorem Tariff uCompou
10、nd Tariff 4.2 TariffsnEffective Rate of Protection(ERP)uthe percentage change in the value added in an industry because of the imposition of a tariff structure by the country rather than the existence of free trade.4.2 TariffsuCalculation of ERP(Way I):4.2 TariffsuCalculation of ERP(Way II):4.2 Tari
11、ffsu Three general rules about the relationship between nominal rates and effective rates of protection:lIf the nominal tariff rate on the final good is higher than the weighted average nominal tariff rate on the inputs,then the ERP will be higher than the nominal rate on the final goods;lIf the nom
12、inal tariff rate on the final good is lower than the weighted average nominal tariff rate on the inputs,then the ERP will be lower than the nominal rate on the final goods;lIf the nominal tariff rate on the final good is equal to the weighted average nominal tariff rate on the inputs,then the ERP wi
13、ll be equal to the nominal rate on the final goods.4.2 TariffsuTwo consequences of the effective rate calculation:lThe degree of effective protection increases as the value added by domestic producers declines.In the formula,the higher the value of aij is,the greater the effective protection rate fo
14、r any given nominal tariff rate on the final product will be.lA tariff on imports used in the production process reduces the level of effective protection.In the formula,as ti rises,the numerator of the formula decreases and hence ERP decreases.4.2 TariffsuConclusionlwhen material inputs or intermed
15、iate products enter a country at a very low duty while the final imported commodity is protected by a high duty,the result tends to be a high protection rate for the domestic producers.The nominal tariff rate on finished goods thus understates the effective rate of protection.lBut should a tariff be
16、 imposed on imported inputs that exceeds that on the finished good,the nominal tariff rate on the finished product would tend to overstate its protective effect.4.2 TariffsuTariff Escalation lThe tariff structures have generally been characterized by rising rates that give greater protection to inte
17、rmediate and finished products than to primary commodities.p The tariff structures of the industrialized countries may indeed discourage the growth of processing,thus hampering diversification into higher value-added exports for the less developed countries,worsening the potential competitive positi
18、on of the less-developed countries in the manufacturing and processing sectors.4.2 TariffsnTariff Welfare Effects uConsumer SurpluslConsumer surplus refers to the difference between the amount that buyers would be willing and able to pay for a good and the actual amount they do pay.uProducer Surplus
19、lProducer surplus is the revenue producers receive over and above the minimum amount required to induce them to supply the good.4.2 Tariffs4.2 TariffsuTrade Welfare Effect of Tariff in a Partial Equilibrium Setting lThe Small-Nation Case 4.2 TariffspThe redistributive effect(Area a)lthe transfer of
20、consumer surplus,in monetary terms,to the domestic producers of the import-competing product.pThe protective effect(Area b)lthe loss to the domestic economy resulting from wasted resources used to produce additional cloth at increasing unit costs.pThe domestic revenue effect(Area c)lthe tariff proce
21、eds paid by country As consumers to its government.pThe consumption effect(Area d)larises from the decrease in consumption resulting from the tariffs artificially increasing the price.pThe deadweight loss (Areas b+d)lrepresents a real cost to a community,not a transfer to other sectors of the econom
22、y.4.2 TariffsuLevying an import tariff,therefore,reduces a small countrys welfare.Welfare Cost of a Tariff Imposed by a Small Nation ItemWelfare Change(Area)Change in consumer surplusabcdChange in producer surplusaChange in government revenuecNet welfare changebd4.2 TariffslThe Large-Nation Case lTh
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