综合中介与金融科技的市场力量.pdf
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1、 Stanford University University of Geneva,Swiss Finance Institute,and CEPR Boston College Integrated Intermediation andFintech Market PowerGreg BuchakN Vera ChauAdam JrringAugust 25,2023AbstractWe document that in the US residential mortgage market,the share of integratedintermediaries acting as bot
2、h originator and servicer has declined dramatically.Exploiting a regulatory change,we show that borrowers with integrated servicers aremore likely to refinance,and conditional on refinance,are more likely to be recapturedby their own servicer.Recaptured borrowers pay lower fees relative to other ref
3、inancers.This trend is partially offset by a rise in integrated fintech originator-servicers,whorecapture at higher frequency but at worse terms.We build and calibrate a dynamicstructural model to interpret these facts and quantify their impact on equilibriumoutcomes.Our model suggests that integrea
4、ted intermediaries enjoy a marginal costadvantage when refinancing recaptured borrowers,and fully disintegrating them wouldreduce refinancing frequencies and increase fees.Fintechs use technology to reacquirecustomers and reduce borrower inertia against refinancing.This endogenously createsmarket po
5、wer,which fintechs exploit through higher fees.Despite worse terms ex-post,fintechs increase consumer welfare ex-ante by increasing refinancing frequencies.Takentogether,our results highlight the importance of intermediaries scope in consumerfinancial outcomes and highlight a novel,quantitatively im
6、portant application offintech:customer acquisition.Keywords:Mortgage market structure,mortgage refinance,fintech,intermediation.JEL Classification Codes:G2,L5We thank Peter DeMarzo,Darrell Duffie,Steve Grenadier,Josh Rauh,Amit Seru,JeffZwiebel,and other seminar partic-ipants at Stanford for comments
7、 and suggestions.We also thank Yoonjoo Hwang for oustanding research assistance.Buchak isat Stanford Graduate School of Business.Email:buchakstanford.edu.Chau is at Swiss Finance Institute&Geneva FinanceResearch Institute.Email:vera.chauunige.ch.Jrring is at Boston College.Email:adam.jorringbc.edu1E
8、lectronic copy available at:https:/ loan origination creates two conceptually distinct assets:the right to the cashflowspaid by the borrowerthe loanand the right and obligation to collect payments from theborrower and forward them to the loans owner in exchange for a feethe servicing right.In atradi
9、tional balance sheet model of banking,origination,servicing,and receiving cashflows areintegrated within one financial intermediary.However,the modern industrial organizationof financial intermediation has seen a striking trend of separating loan origination from loanownership,e.g.,in the context of
10、 residential mortgage origination(Buchak et al.,2023)orsmall business lending(Gopal and Schnabl,2020).This paper documents and explores theconsequences of an additional margin of dis-integration:the increased separation of loanoriginator and loan servicer.We study this phenomenon in he context of th
11、e US residential mortgage market.As inother contexts,the mortgage servicer occupies an important role in the mortgage interme-diation chain.In particular,the servicer maintains a long-term,ongoing relationship withthe borrower:The servicer collects monthly payments and forwards them to the mortgageo
12、wner.The servicer reminds the borrower when there are late payments.The servicer ispotentially responsible for ex-post modifications in the event of delinquency or default.Inshort,unlike the originator or mortgage owner,the servicer plays an active role in the fi-nancial life of the mortgage borrowe
13、r far after the point of origination.For this reason,it isnatural to expect that characteristics of the servicer will have an impact on the borrowersex-post financial decisions,such as refinancing or default.This paper focuses on the therefinancing impliactions of mortgage servicers.Our paper uncove
14、rs two key economic forces that distinguish combined originator-servicerswhich we term integrated intermediariesand integrated fintechs from other,dis-integrated financial intermediaries.First,we show that integrated intermediaries possess acost advantage in refinancing their existing servicing cust
15、omers.In particular,by virtue oftheir long-term relationship with the borrower,the servicer already possesses documents,credit information,and access that are key in the origination of a new loan.Second,we findthat integrated“fintech”1intermediaries appear to be able to use data and customer accessf
16、or the purposes of more effective customer acquisition in a manner that non-fintech lenderslack the technical expertise to implement.In particular,fintech lenders are able to refinancetheir“woodhead”servicing customers who would not otherwise be looking to refinance,andcan exploit their resulting ma
17、rket power to refinance the borrower at a higher markup.We first establish these facts in reduced form in three steps.After documenting a secular1We define a“Fintech”intermediary as in Buchak et al.(2018a),where a lender is a Fintech if the loanapplication occurs entirely online and the potential bo
18、rrower is able to obtain a firm,contractual rate quotewithout interacting with a human loan officer.2Electronic copy available at:https:/ in the market share of integrated intermediaries that is partially offset by a rise inintegrated fintech intermediaries,we provide identified evidence that integr
19、ated intermedi-aries lead to more refinancing using a regulatory shock to the capital treatment of mortgageservicing rights on bank balance sheets.Next,using a novel forward-merged data set thatallows us to match mortgage originations to future refinances of those same mortgages,weshow that refinanc
20、es originated by the existing servicer are executed with lower fees.Thissuggests that these lenders possess a marginal cost advantage when refinancing their owncustomers.We find,however,that fintech intermediaries charge significantly higher fees andrefinance their servicing customers sooner and at
21、lower rate benefit to the borrower,suggest-ing that they are targeting borrowers who would not otherwise be attempting to refinanceand charging markups when doing so.Finally,we rule out that our results are driven byalternate mechanisms,such as one intermediary type possessing superior underwriting
22、skills.After establishing these facts in reduced form,we build and calibrate a structural modelthat allows us to quantify the size of these forces and consider equilibrium counterfactualswhere originators and servicers are fully dis-integrated or where fintech never entered.Wefind that fully dis-int
23、egrating the servicing market would decrease the annual rate of mort-gage refinance by roughly 10%and increase prices by roughly 5%.This is primarily drivenby the loss of the marginal cost advantage in loan production.The implication from thiscounterfactual is that the rapid dis-integration of the s
24、ervicing market was likely responsi-ble for a reduction in the number of borrowers who refinanced their mortgages while ratesdeclined between 2010 and 2022.Additionally,we find that the customer acquisition aspectof financial technology has had a large quantitative impact on mortgage refinance prope
25、n-sities and costs.Fintech customer acquisition ability increased the annual rate of mortgagerefinancing by roughly 25%relative to the baseline.It did so by overcoming woodheadedborrower inertia and splitting the resulting surplus by increasing fees by roughly 5%.Our paper begins by documenting two
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- 综合 中介 金融 科技 市场 力量
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